One morning recently my interest was attracted to the behaviour of my dog, who interrupted his walk when he spied a cat sitting on a window ledge and engaged in a series of bellicose gestures towards this cat. By tapping the dog with the newspaper that had just been purchased, I abruptly terminated the display, and he went on with no further interest in the cat. Whatever the physiological details of the connection between the stimulus of the dog's seeing the cat and the overt performance, his behaviour seemed to follow a controlling programme. This control was switched off by my intervention. Doubtless if the cat had moved, the dog would have altered his programme in response to the altered stimuli. It must be confessed that it is-somewhat odd to apply to a dog's behaviour a conception that is proper for an automatic calculating machine: nevertheless it will bear reflection.
engine, the newspapers do not err in the essential. On the other hand, there is some danger that the academic world may be generally disposed to dismiss the matter that lies behind the headlines as unworthy of its attention.
The main ideas of the logical structure required of a universal calculating machine were conceived over a hundred years ago by Charles Babbage in England. 1 We are now entering on the social revolution that must follow from the fact that the advent of electronic invention has drastically reduced the time required for large-scale computing. Elementary arithmetical operations on numbers comprising ten decimal digits can be carried out in a few millionths of a second. In whatever field of human activity computing or accounting (in its widest sense) can be brought to bear for practical affairs, there we can contemplate with assurance the intervention of the electronic computing device--provided, of course, that it has the capacity to store the relevant information and the speed necessary to use that information to produce results in time to control other machines or to influence executive decisions. The control of traffic in transportation systems, automatic control of factory production, inventory control, and other obvious applications in business, industry, and commerce are now being achieved, and new uses are being planned whose consequences for the economy under which we live are very difficult to forecast. At present the main restrictions on the rate at which this change can take place lie in the large cost of the machines (of the order of a few million dollars for one of large capacity) and the lack of men trained to use them effectively. That both the cost and physical size of these machines will be greatly reduced is no doubt the expectation of the engineers engaged in designing them. It is also envisaged that many machines will be introduced to operate with infrequent changes of programme, so that the demand for the services of mathematicians, physicists, and engineers will be mainly for those machines that are applied to scientific or engineering computing services and for the staffs of those concerns which design machines and new ways of using them.
The digital computing machine operates with an uncompromising attention to detail that must be imagined by the man who prepares the programme. This programme will be fed into the machine's store to control the course of the calculation. All instructions are coded numerically and enter the input of the machine usually via punched paper tape or punched cards. Since the binary system of counting requires only two digits (viz, 0 and 1) it is the most easy to use electronically to represent numbers and has been very widely adopted. In this system, counting proceeds from 0 to 8, for example, as follows; 0, 1, 10, 11, 100, 101, 110, 111, 1000. The number 1024=2 10 is denoted in this scale as 10000000000. Machines can be used to convert numbers entering in decimal form and conversely to convert the answer from binary to decimal form in the output. There is a marked trend to incorporate other facilities in machines so as to reduce the number of detailed instructions required from the programmer. For it is in fact necessary to atomize mathematics in order to compute by machine. This process can be carried out by the machine if the programmer chooses an iterative method; then a set of instructions can be used again and again in the same calculation. By means of a library of routines partial programmes devised for one problem are made available for others. The design of an automatic digital computer comprises circuits that in functioning would give effect to certain basic instructions such as "transfer the number at a particular place in the store to another register in the machine," "add a number into the accumulator," and so on.
Machines operate with different sets of basic orders, but all of them have a conditional control order according to which two numbers are compared. Depending on which is the larger the machine automatically looks to the appropriate place in the store for its next instruction. This device enables an iteration to be terminated and can be employed to make effective a criterion for choosing one course rather than another. It is this feature that enables a machine to play a game such as checkers.
However certain and pen'asive the effects to be expected from the intervention of computing machines in industry and commerce, and perhaps because many of these effects are obvious, the academic world is hardly sensitive yet to the potential influence of the intellectual stimulus derived from experience with computing machines. In what follows I propose to try to expose some of these potentialities.
In the first place, numerical analysis-a branch of mathematics that has rarely received the attention it merits from pure mathematiciansis now emerging as an intellectually exciting subject. One must learn to conceive of processes for solving particular mathematical problems in relation to the computing resources available. This is an obvious point. Nevertheless, much of mathematical analysis has grown up in a computing vacuum. This process will now almost certainly come to an end, for analytic methods that never could be economically appropriate for a machine will not be used in practice. The airy disdain of the mathematician who is not interested in the numerical realization of his formulations can now be called in question because computing can be done on the grand scale without tedium-but only if the calculation is programmed appropriately for a machine. Consequently the mathematician who wishes to isolate himself from actuality has to vacate a lot of territory he has up to now regarded as his intellectual birthright.
Secondly, computing by machine opens new roads to mathematical generalization. For instance, physics and engineering easily provide examples of systems that should in principle be describable by means of non-linear differential equations. By means of a machine one may solve such an equation numerically with particular data. If enough instances with different data are examined in detail, one can learn properties of the solutions that may lead to inductions about the solution of such equations, which in turn may be fruitful both for pure mathematics and for physics.
In the light of these reflections it is hard to refrain from suggesting that academic attitudes towards the study of mathematics should be modified. The "aesthetic appeal" attributed so widely among mathematicians to the experience of the mathematical innovator is now tempered and indeed enriched by thinking about the realization of formal processes. At the Computation Centre in the University of Toronto we were concerned some years ago with solving a system of 74 equations in 74 unknowns and the question arises: how accurate are the answers? In principle one can propose several ways of finding this out. Unfortunately the amount of computing involved in applying them is at least three times as much as requiretl for the process of solution itself, so that to assess the accuracy of the solution is quite unreasonably expensive. It seems difficult to escape the conclusion that the examination of the error, in a numerical calculation, arising from the circumstance that only a finite number of digits is carried through each arithmetical operation must be conceived in relation to an actual method for finding the error. If the answer to the main calculation is obtained by iteration, comparison of the results of successive iterations will, for practical purposes, lead to good estimates of the errors.
Not only does the necessity to treat all numbers by finite series of digits force us to consider the propagation of error, it also reveals, on occasion, that some general methods (usually regarded as acceptable in the textbooks) are invalid when applied to particular examples. Experience in computing makes quite clear that ability to improvise is an essential adjunct to the mathematical skill of the programmer. There is really nothing new in this discovery, but the emergence of computing on a large scale has emphasized afresh the need for practical attitudes in doing mathematics. This conclusion is likely to be contested vigorously by those mathematicians who have neither interest nor experience in computing and it is probably unpalatable to others because it seems aimed against academic isolationism. A mathematician with the practical attitude referred to in the foregoing remarks will recognize as his proper business not only physical or engineering problems but also the mathematical questions that arise in numerical analysis.
For natural scientists the high-speed electronic computer is a tool to be used for the numerical analysis of experimental data or for applying theory to phenomena more complicated than can be treated without such aid. Both uses lead to a better understanding of nature. By means of X-rays, for example, much may be learned of the structure of large molecules that interest biochemists (and eventually physiologists and geneticists) if adequate computing aid is available. Great progress has already been made in developing effective methods to provide this aid.
In engineering the computing machine is well suited to produce the substantial volume of engineering information required to justify designers' choices of structures and machines. As the means of giving effect to well-established physical theory and engineering design practice, large-scale computing can be more economical than working in a laboratory with models intended to produce comparable detailed knowledge of the behaviour of the system being studied under varied conditions of operation and families of assumed values of design parameters. The distribution of flow rates and water levels in a complicated system such as the St. Lawrence Seaway is a good example of a problem to which electronic digital computing has been applied successfully to get more detailed results than would normally be available without its aid.
Perhaps the most interesting mathematical development associated with computers is the new interest in the theory of games. A machine can be programmed to play a game provided that the programmer invents a good formulation by means of which the machine can evaluate each possible next move or finite series of moves. If the rate of play is not to be intolerably slow, the machine must not be required to examine too many possibilities before applying the criterion that selects the next move. If two or more moves are found to have equal value, the choice is made by chance with the aid of a random-number generator.
Consideration of the mathematical questions related to programming for games leads one to investigate strategy and to attempt to devise means by which the machine may generate its own programme. Here surely is a field that may contribute to the use of computing machines in quite novel ways.
The systematic examination of all possibilities for a limited number of possible future moves is at once the strength and weakness of the machine as a player. Each possible move is examined by its ritual because the machine has no selecting process for summarily discarding obviously unpromising moves as a human player does. In this there is, I think, an obvious moral for formalists who are concerned to discountenance the intelligent judgment of an individual man in favour of machine-like routines for investigating nature or man's social activities. The routine uses up computing time evaluating the insignificant. Just as the number of moves in a game that can be examined is limited by the speed of computing and that at which the game is to be played, so also must formalism automatically impose limits on its usefulness as a means of making significant progress in learning. This frustration can be mitigated to some extent if a formal routine can be applied through some high-speed device. But without the highly selective operation of a human mind to judge whether or not the output of the machine is relevant in a significant way to the purpose that brought the routine into existence, what the high-speed device does is generate the intellectual equivalent of noise.
Imagine that one had to enumerate all the possible combinations of moves in even the simplest game played on a board. The mere task of actually writing down significant signs to represent them could not be accomplished, so rapidly do the combinations multiply in number in the course of the imagined series of moves. By such elaboration are evolved the complicated possibilities of applying even a relatively simple scheme of rules to a small number of pieces. Now imagine one were presented with many examples of the series of moves made in a number of different games that have been played according to the same rules. Could one hope to discover the rules? This is somewhat like the kind of question that turns up in science-in the study of the weather, in astronomy, and in geophysics. In each of these sciences computing machines are being used to investigate hypotheses of varying scope. By faith in the scientific method, men commit themselves to such activities with the expectation that progress can be made towards understanding in ever increasing detail these aspects of our environment. A physical scientist is perhaps entitled to reflect that the same kind of human activity might eventually make more progress than it has in the past towards understanding human behaviour, because with the aid of large machines it is now possible to manage very much more elaborate representations than can be attempted without that aid. Despite those prejudices masquerading in literature as facts-namely, that because of life's complexity it is impossible to theorize effectively about man's activities by the methods of physical science-some quite ingenious thinkers are preparing to commit substantial effort to attempting the "impossible." The activity will evolve and will never come to an end until men stop trying. In the process perhaps the most important result will be our changed attitude towards knowledge itself; but that is too large a matter to open here.
The invention of large fast machines is probably an even more significant achievement for man's intellectual future than the invention of the differential calculus. Instead of depending on the neat formulations that can be written down by one man and elaborated by algebra and mathematical analysis, we seem now to have open to us the combined resources of analysis and the arithmetical powerhouse to derive from the numbers we do know the set of numbers we desire to know about an actual or imagined system. All of the activities of man that involve counting in order to plan, design, and manage are affected.
Not only numbers are treated, however. Calculations with logical elements can also be managed by machine. The possibilities of ordering and combining them in large numbers can be investigated. Thus the whole range of the calculating aspects of thinking is being affected. In so far as one is prepared to commit human judgment to criteria that can be formulated in detail, a machine can be used to select according to these criteria-which, it should be emphasized, need not be few in number or given effect according to a simple scheme. Man will always have a part to play in selecting some criteria to govern the operation of a machine, but it is much too early in the history of computing machines to predict how much of man's function can be entrusted to the machine. In learning to use these machines we shall come to appreciate how much the family of inventions associated with electronic computing can contribute to a better understanding of our environment and of ourselves if we are willing to use them for this purpose. From the study of relatively small systems we can learn how we might undertake the management of larger ones. Learning will presumably proceed by induction from experience and by inventions that give proper technical effect to these inductions. But this progress cannot occur unless men commit themselves and their present resources of knowledge to investigate what can be done. For example, to what extent can a computing machine contribute to the enormous task of translating scholarly and scientific writing in a foreign language? Clearly it will take a long time before it will be possible to have a machine render translations with the skill and insight of an accomplished linguist who really understands the subject of the work being translated. But without this linguist's participation at some stage in the evolution of translation by electronic devices the literary quality of the result will be poor.
The foregoing is only one example of the situations that will arise in trying to use computing machines on the one hand to reduce the amount of drudgery by scholars and on the other to stimulate them to reassess their own potentialities. For instance let us look at some of the purposes to be served by teaching various languages in a university. Not all of the graduates are going to become professional scholars expert in the literature and culture of other lands, or amateurs endowed with the means and desire to travel abroad. One important social justification is to educate some students whose understanding of foreign languages can aid the international communication that is an essential part of modem life, whether it be in business, industry, government, or research in medicine, science, and engineering. This function must be performed economically, and wherever machines can contribute to economy it is surely reasonable to employ them. In appreciating this thought an academic man can help his institution and, in due course, participate in its reinvigorated life.
Because of its attention to detail a large part of scholarly, as well as scientific, work proceeds according to rule, and could be performed much more economically by machine than without it. Problems concerning the storing, accessibility, and communication of knowledge are with us now. But these matters are too often regarded by academic scholars as outside the scope of their interest-as indeed they are of the scholars who have not acquired the attitude of mind which should characterize scientific research and which has been happily described as "a friendly welcoming attitude to change."
The changes in outlook that suggest associating philosophical reflections about language games with the serious practical application of computing machines have grown in the intellectual environment produced mainly by the great advances in biology during the past fifty years. Mechanisms in the functioning of our bodies have been revealed in some of the most impressive of man's scientific achievements and these discoveries have changed our conception of the possibility of understanding some of the "mysteries" of living behaviour. We were ready to follow Claude Bernard in finding that physics and chemistry aid our understanding of physiological function. Having invented quite marvellous machines to imitate motor response to stimulus in a living system or to carry out calculations, we are now in a much better position to appreciate just how wonderful is the human brain. No machine has been conceived with even the possibility of storing the amount of information that can be retained by one average brain. And of course no machine is capable of the flexibility of the processes for handling not only what is stored but also what is in course of being added in the adaptable behaviour of a man.
It is really not surprising that experience with automatic computing machines should impress one with the flexibility of the selecting mechanisms we use in our daily life. Only in intellectual activities are we ready to give up being adaptable and to set up rules for guiding thinking which have much the same effect as has a poor programme for a machine intended to play checkers. I believe that it is no accident that we have had Wittgenstein's philosophical reflections on games in the same decade that an electronic digital computer has been programmed to play them and that theorists in computing are deeply concerned with logical matters formerly pre-empted by arts scholars. All of these developments have originated in practical as opposed to doctrinaire theoretical attitudes towards living.
Wittgenstein's detailed philosophical analysis 2 of many linguistic expressions proceeds by looking at language in relation to our behaviour and exhibits how formalism has tended to mislead philosophers. His work must in the long run have important practical consequences. He has treated some at least of the expressions that tempt a non-scientist to limit in his imagination the scope of scientific and engineering invention. In these expressions cultural influences originating in a scholarly past divorced from practice and invention are brought to bear with a somewhat specious literary effectiveness. They tend to discourage new approaches to problems that we seem now for the first time to be able to attack with some prospect of success. In appreciating the logical analogies by which we succeed in coping, through language, with the variety and adaptability of individual behaviour, Wittgenstein's investigations seem to me especially significant. They show just how we are misled to treat language according to very simple logical schemes. In attempting to represent some aspects of human affairs, a user of a computing machine has also to beware of these traps. Fortunately he is not limited nearly so drastically as the philosophers, mathematicians, and logicians in attempting to represent varieties of logical structure that appear to have family resemblances to each other, for he has at his disposal vast resources to represent the individual members of each family.
In essence the keys to a proper appreciation of the difficulty of these matters are the realistic estimates of the numbers of the classes of signs used in representation, the populations of these classes, and the number and complexity of the processes by which the signs are to be combined. These are specifications that a computing machine intended to deal with them must fulfil. In principle this condition is met in many everyday affairs. There is no fairy's wand to wave away the exacting attention to detail-distasteful as this may be to the lotus-eaters.
In thinking about the capacity of the human brain in its role as a data processing system with very elaborate means to take in information and to act on it-and, we might add, to act also without ostensible stimulus from without-we have to attempt to estimate the corresponding numbers. The number of cells in the cortex of the human brain is about 1.5 X 10 10 , a number that should be compared with the tens of thousands of vacuum tubes or transistors in a large modem computer or the hardly larger number of storage elements in a magnetic-core memory. The possibility of storing much larger amounts of information in a machine is achieved only at the cost of very much slower operation which, in turn, limits the scope of the machine's usefulness.
When we tum from the mere number of cells to connections between them we know only a little that can help our comparison. Nevertheless, at Massachusetts Institute of Technology W. Pitts and W. S. McCulloch have exposed some of the logical possibilities with the aid of a simple model of the working of the nervous system. At Princeton the late J. von Neumann, one of the ablest minds of this century, mathematician, scientist, and designer of computing machines, made a detailed comparison of human brains with computing machines. Anyone who was fortunate enough to hear him lecture on this subject will recall the intellectual excitement of the occasion. We are better able to appreciate how marvellous is the brain because of the experience of designing a large calculating machine. In a somewhat different analysis, but surely inspired by the same contrast, the late A. M. Turing, who conceived the logical design of the first University of Manchester computer, has shown that by combining on a sufficiently grand scale a certain few very simple operations a machine could perform feats of amazing complexity. It seems now to be widely believed by mathematicians interested in computers that the superiority of the brain over machines lies essentially in the greater complexity of the nervous system and the greater efficiency of the human memory. A physicist or an engineer would probably like to remark on the very small amount of energy required for the brain's functioning compared with that required to operate a computing machine. The machine must be maintained in operation by a staff of special engineers. If one part of the machine fails, it produces a wrong answer. The human system maintains itself by the living process. If a part is damaged the rest of the system adapts itself to make good the deficiency. The electronic machine must perform each detailed step correctly or it gets the wrong answer to the whole calculation. The brain functions in quite a different way, for it is not so vulnerable to imperfections in the operations of its parts. And finally it develops its own programmes-if, and here we return to Wittgenstein, the word "programme" applies at all in a simple sense to the way in which we think.
To my mind, biological science is likely in the long run to be the great resource for innovation with respect to computing machines and the inventions descended not only from them but also from the other automatic devices we know today. The most promising road seems to be that of imitating nature with the aid of the theoretical tools provided by mathematics and physics to help us engineer our efforts to copy her methods in living systems. By using these inventions men will enlarge the scope and versatility of intellectual activity for worthy ends. By reflecting on them, men can be inspired by new vistas of the wonderful intricacy of creation. There is no evidence that the process of exploring it will come to an end.
NOTES
The first true calculating machine was made by Blaise Pascal in 1652 mainly to add sums of money. The development of machines in England and on the Continent was notably advanced by Leibnitz's invention of a machine with a type of stepped reckoner (first made in 1694). But all the early machines fall far short of Babbage's conception ( 1833).
